

Sandinistas who now occupy the old dictator's bunker, he fought on the ground rather than from a safe sanctuary.

In the letter to President Reagan, Mr. Pastora thanks the president for his past support and outlines his movement's objectives:

- "Withdrawal of Cuban, Soviet and other communist forces from Nicaragua".

- "Reduction of Nicaragua's communist armed forces, which oppress the Nicaraguan people and threaten Nicaragua's neighbors".

- "An end to the export of subversion from Nicaragua, which would be the logical consequence of achieving the first two objectives."

In the bluntest possible language, Mr. Pastora also warns the president

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goal of freedom fighters... the often lonely struggle for freedom... we are fortunate to have you as a best friend. With your leadership and strength, democracy will prevail in the struggle against communist oppression. Our objectives, simply put, consist of making good the original commitments made by the Junta to the Nicaraguan people and to the

see LETTER, page 6A

ragua.

"Why would the junta deal with Nicaragua's freedom fighters if they can crush them militarily? Can anyone find an example of communist concessions to a weak opponent?"

Mr. Pastora's questions are not those of a diplomat or even a professional manager of violence engaged in low-intensity conflict. He is, after all, engaged in a life-and-death struggle that for him has only winners and losers. He also has the advantage of knowing his former colleagues far better than anyone else does — in or out of the American government.

"The communist objective is to destroy us, and negotiations are one

see PASTORA, page 6A

Eden Pastora, Nicaragua's



## Embassy in Moscow 'riddled with KGB'

THE WASHINGTON TIMES

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow "is riddled with KGB operatives" who are operating under the cover of support and maintenance workers, according to White House and congressional sources.

These sources told The Washington Times that there are between 100 and 130 Soviets working at the U.S. Embassy at any given time. They handle routine maintenance, electrical and plumbing repairs, do the building cleaning and, until recently, answered the telephones.

Soviet personnel also are used as auto mechanics and drivers for U.S.

diplomats. They run the food-service operations and man the kiosk in the embassy where liquor is sold.

U.S. counterintelligence officials say that these Soviets, who are assigned their tasks by the Kremlin, also take orders from and report to the KGB on goings-on at the embassy.

CBS News reported Monday that about a dozen typewriters in the embassy had been traced from 1962 to the KGB. The KGB also used the typewriters to type letters to the U.S. Embassy.

the typewriters "picked up the contents of documents typed by embassy secretaries and transmitted them to antennas hidden in the embassy walls," CBS said. "The KGB also used the typewriters to type letters to the U.S. Embassy."

CBS quoted one intelligence officer as saying the potential for compromising sensitive information should be viewed with "considerable seriousness."

U.S. officials have been warning for several years of the security risks associated with employing Soviet nationals in the embassy.

But, they report, the State Department has not felt sufficiently concerned to warrant changing the situation.

"It's an outrage," one senior

see KGB, page 8A

## Technology protection stirs inter-agency war

By Ted Agres  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

As the Soviet Union attempts to steal high-technology from the United States, the government protectors of America's most precious technological secrets

with each other. The oppositionally staid Customs Service pitted against its ally, the Customs Service.

Each department is at odds with the other with the management

massive leaks of highly sensitive information to the Soviets.

And each department is fighting for turf in the high-tech review and enforcement process.

For starters, here are some verbal collos: Commerce Dept.

cently to have de- newspaper writers. 'aab, U.S. Cur- mer.

United Sta- make that asser- ist a candidate for 'ear Award. Then er there [in Cus-

## Closing of Pennsylvania Avenue to guard White House suggested

By Warren Strobel  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES


with no portion of the most famous House security, a Secret Service spokesman said.

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## FOOD



## Mengele new ene

By John Holmes  
THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Low: 4 on Jan. 21  
 Yesterday's precipitation: .00 Normal: .11  
 Record: 2.16 in 1978  
 March precipitation: .00  
 1985 precipitation: 6.81  
 Air Quality Index: Good (35)

June	2.01	-----	3.99	11.53-1972
July	4.09	-----	3.88	11.06-1945
August	2.30	-----	4.40	14.4-1928
September	2.51	-----	2.22	12.26-1975
October	3.66	-----	2.82	6.70-1963
November	3.66	-----	3.18	6.54-1909
December	1.18	-----		

Geneva	55:40pc	Seoul	57:36c
Helsinki	34:29sl	Stockholm	38:33sh
Hong Kong	73:67c	Sydney	72:62pc
Jerusalem	67:40c	Taipei	68:41c
London	44:40sh	Vienna	57:38sh
Madrid	59:31pc	Warsaw	58:32c

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re and conviction of Mengele. Kennedy has written to the Senate Appropriations Committee to ask that the measure be included in a spokesman said yesterday.

Kennedy's sentiments were echoed by Sen. Alfonse D'Amato, who called The Times' gesture an excellent idea.

Anything to further the cause, to start the search for and seizure of him is all for the better," said D'Amato, one of the senators most active in seeking Nazi war criminals.

Attorney General Edwin Meese said the reward as "a further source of concern the people have in this country, which is reflected in the fact that we have several of our citizens cooperating with other countries to locate and apprehend him."

Justice Department joined the search for Mengele last month. A former U.S. Army counterintelligence officer said he believed American intelligence services arrested, questioned and freed Mengele in Austria in 1947. Attorney General William French Smith initiated the investigation, which Mr. Meese, who succeeded him, has continued.

A spokesman for the West German Embassy said it had received no official word from Bonn on the matter yesterday. He noted, however, that "since our legal authorities have put out the reward, we see we have every interest in seeing Mengele can be found and

appreciate the offer of this. It is a warm, resonant affirmation of decency," said Mr. Perlman of the Anti-Defamation League. "Over the decades, the conviction with the apprehension of these kable beasts like Mengele has been lonely and anguished. To a paper of the stature of The New York Times do this is reassuring."

Mr. Hier said some of the information the Wiesenthal Center has received since posting its reward is "to be valuable," but he urged the newspaper to exercise care and discretion in sifting through any information it receives.

missiles nor explained how they pay for them at a time of \$200 billion federal deficits.

The time has come to stop showing other how tough we are," Mr. Hier said. "The time has come to bring them together and make an effort of peace for all mankind."

As argued that instead of the MX as a bargaining chip in the arms race, it was

## KGB

From page 1A

administration official said.

"When a Russian dissident, or people wanting to give us information, called the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, his call would be answered by a KGB switchboard operator."

The situation has prompted several high-level investigations, the sources said. A counterintelligence specialist was dispatched to Moscow earlier this year to study the embassy staffing situation firsthand. His report was said to include the following:

- Soviet nationals operate the embassy carpool and also are the auto mechanics. In this capacity they have access to the diplomatic fleet. Officials suspect that bugs may have been planted in the various vehicles. Even if they haven't, having a Soviet driver should make confidential conversation impossible.

- The kiosk in the embassy, which sells liquor as well as sundries, is staffed by Soviet nationals. These people can observe who in the embassy may have a drinking problem — important information to KGB recruitment or blackmail efforts.

- The person operating the embassy canteen is said to be a Chilean by birth married to a Soviet citizen. "Pablo," as he is called, is friendly with many American diplomats. But, as one source said, "What is he doing at the embassy in Moscow if he is not a Chilean communist?"

"Pablo, along with Soviets working in the kitchen, can observe who is having lunch with whom, who is flirting with whom, and so on," the source said. Again, this is said to be useful information to the KGB.

- The embassy telephone operators are Soviets. This gives them firsthand knowledge of who is calling in and the potential to monitor conversations. One source said this situation, at least, may have changed since the counterintelligence officer's report.

Having Soviet nationals roaming the U.S. Embassy has long worried some Reagan administration officials.

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) launched its own investigation of the embassy staffing situation in 1983.

According to a source familiar with the PFIAB probe, State Department and other officials were asked to explain the rationale for employing Soviets rather than American citizens.

Secretary of State George Shultz reportedly told PFIAB that he was not personally aware of the embassy situation. The panel also asked Richard Combs, who was deputy director of the State Department's Soviet Desk, for an explanation.

Mr. Combs reportedly replied that it was standard practice to employ Soviet nationals for menial and support work at the embassy. The reason, he reportedly said, hinged on both budgetary and policy reasons.

If Americans were hired to do the work it would cost the taxpayer far more, Mr. Combs reportedly said. Furthermore, these lower-level workers would be subject to recruitment by the KGB and would represent a security risk. According to this source, it was felt safer to have "known" KGB operatives around the embassy than unknown operatives.

"Their thinking was that at least you knew who the KGB was with the Soviets there," the source said. "But if the KGB recruited an American, you wouldn't necessarily know about it."

This logic apparently irritated several PFIAB members, who challenged Mr. Combs. "By this reasoning, you would say it would be best if all our embassy positions were staffed by the KGB," one member charged.

Mr. Combs, who is now director of the State Department's Office of East European Affairs, declined yesterday to comment on the situation.

"I did speak to PFIAB two or three years ago," Mr. Combs said, "but what you are asking about is all very classified information. We just can't comment on it. It's highly sensitive."

PFIAB is a presidentially-appointed civilian panel whose purpose is to advise the president on intelligence matters.

— Ted Agres

## Peter Steiner

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# Embassy Typewriter Bugging Blamed on Routine Shipment

By David Hoffman  
Washington Post Staff Writer

Typewriters bugged by the Soviets in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow had been shipped through "normal channels" instead of receiving special diplomatic handling, allowing electronic devices to be placed in them, intelligence sources said yesterday.

They speculated that the bugs were "passive" devices that reflected signals to low-level trans-

mitters hidden in embassy walls, presumably allowing the Soviets to monitor what was written on the typewriters.

Administration officials confirmed this week that the Soviets had penetrated security at the embassy for at least a year, and perhaps longer, by "lifting things off typewriters." They said the bugging was ended after being discovered last year.

One source, who asked not to be

identified, said yesterday that the Soviets probably did not gather much valuable U.S. intelligence by bugging the typewriters because little of the most highly sensitive material would be kept in the Moscow embassy.

In addition, this source said, material kept there is handled carefully in special areas that have been "swept" for listening devices, making it impossible for the typewriter bugs to work.

"I don't regard it as terribly serious," the source said of the bugging, suggesting that the security breach is not as threatening to the United States as other intelligence losses to the Soviets in recent years.

An administration official said, "The trouble is that you never know exactly what they did get" with the devices in typewriters. The incident "was taken seriously" by U.S. officials, he said.